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TOO MANY MIGRANTS, TOO FEW SERVICES: 
 A MODEL OF DECISION-MAKING ON IMMIGRATION 






In this paper we model the demand for immigrants as a trade-off native voters face between 
having services, produced by unskilled and non-assimilated immigrants, and experiencing 
disutility due to the immigrant workers having a culture different from the native culture. 
Immigrants decide whether to integrate into the native culture. If they don’t, they produce 
services. Assimilated immigrants take on skilled jobs. At the political level natives choose the 
number of immigrants that can be allowed, given some fixed price for services. We show that, 
at the assumed price, it is never optimal for natives to have equilibrium or unemployment in 
the service sector. Market forces then lead to higher service prices, implying that the initially 
allowed number of immigrants is too large. 
JEL: D72, F22. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In Europe, the immigrant population has reached unprecedented high levels, amounting 
to about 10% in countries such as, e.g., France, Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands. 
Two characteristics of immigrant workers in Europe stand out. First, compared to native 
workers,  they  appear  to  be  concentrated  in  low-skilled,  low-paid  jobs.  Second, 
immigrants are geographically concentrated in specific areas of the immigrant country, in 
particular, in the big cities. For instance, in the four largest cities in the Netherlands, 30% 
of the residents belong to the non-native population (Dagevos et al., 2003).  
Lazear  (1999)  asserts  that  assimilation  of  natives  is  less  likely  when  the 
emigrants’  culture  is  strongly  represented  in  the  receiving  country.  This  makes  their 
position on the labor market more vulnerable as they will then tend to be admitted to the 
“secondary labor market” only where flat low wages are paid and mobility to better paid 
jobs  is  low  (See,  Dickens  and  Lang,  1985,  for  an  early  empirical  appraisal  of  the 
existence of dual labor markets).  
Recently, the increasing number of immigrants has affected the political climate 
in  the  receiving  countries  to  a  large  extent.  An  increasing  anxiety  has  arisen  among 
natives,  fed  by  the  fear  that  a  too  large  stock  of  non-assimilating  non-natives  can 
undermine the social norms natives adhere to. It is an indisputable fact that different 
societies  have  different  social  norms,  and  immigrants  may  bring  along  social  norms 
which conflict with those of the native populations. People (both immigrants and natives) 
can feel disutility when they are confronted with social norms that contradict their own 
norms
1.   
In this paper we model the above described status of immigrants, and the attitude 
of natives towards immigrants in a two-sector economy with a primary sector producing 
goods using skilled labor, and a secondary sector, producing services only using unskilled 
labor.  The  labor  force  consists  of  immigrant  and  native  workers.  Immigrants  decide 
whether to integrate into the native culture. If immigrants do not assimilate, they can only 
                                                           
1 It goes without saying that the individual attitudes towards the cultural effects of immigration may be 
diverse. Some native  individuals  might  have a taste  for  multiculturalism and  welcome immigration as 
contributing to new ideas and opening up a variety of cultures to be enjoyed, while others prefer a more   3
find a job in the secondary services sector. If they do assimilate, they will lose utility due 
to losing their own culture, but they will gain in income, as they will become skilled 
workers in the goods sector. Native workers are all skilled so they depend upon non-
assimilating immigrants to produce services. However, natives experience disutility if 
immigrant workers have a culture different from their own culture (see Hillman (2002) 
for an analogous modeling). 
  Natives make the following decisions. At the individual level they decide on the 
consumption of goods and services. At the macro political level they choose the number 
of immigrants that can be allowed into the country
2. In making this political decision the 
native workers take the endogenous assimilation decision of immigrants into account, but 
they take the price of services as exogenously given
3.  
Our basic result is that, at the assumed price for services, it is never optimal for 
natives to allow in a number of immigrants that implies equilibrium or unemployment in 
the service sector. In other words, the political demand for immigrants will always be 
such that services are rationed. The intuition of this result is as follows. In the market 
equilibrium  for  services,  the  marginal  benefit  of  consuming  services  is  equal  to  its 
marginal costs. However, as natives in demanding immigrants, not only take account of 
the  marginal  costs  and  benefits  of  consuming  services,  but  also  include  the  cultural 
burden  non-assimilated  immigrants  impose  upon  them,  their  political  demand  for 
immigrants will imply that the marginal benefit of services consumption is higher than 
the marginal costs. 
In  a  market  economy  prices  will  increase,  following  the  initial  rationing 
equilibrium. Assuming that it will not possible to send off immigrants who initially were 
                                                                                                                                                                             
homogeneous  society  (see  Mayda,  2004).  We,  however,  assume  that  the  ‘average’  native  voter  has  a 
distaste for cultural differences. 
2 Modelling the demand for immigration as a result of utility maximization has obtained some popularity in 
the public-choice oriented literature. For example, Benhabib (1996) derives the demand for immigrants as a 
function of their wealth compared to the wealth of the median voter. In Haupt and Peters  (1998) natives 
demand immigrants in order to get lower social-security taxes or higher social-security benefits.  
3 Native voters are well aware of some of the economic consequences of immigration as Mayda (2004) has 
demonstrated. She finds that political attitudes toward immigrants are related to labour-market concerns 
and cultural considerations. These effects thus do not pertain to prices of specific consumption goods. 
Labour-market concerns are a factor in our model as far as the rate of unemployment among immigrants is 
involved. As we assume exogenous wages, crowding on the labour market, which is usually one of the 
culprits for anti-immigration attitudes of natives, does not play a role here. On the other hand, the fact that   4
allowed to enter the country, the consequence of flexible prices will be that the number of 
immigrants in a country is too large. Another undesired consequence of services price 
increases can be that the formal services sector will be replaced by an informal sector, 
where  services  are  produced  at  home  or  in  the  shadow  economy.  This  will  lead  to 
unemployment for the non-integrated immigrants.  
Native  voters  will,  under  certain  circumstances,  support  policies  aimed  at 
ameliorating the assimilation decision by immigrants. Within our model we will analyze 
two  such  policies.  A  first  policy  option  to  analyze  within  the  model  is  focused  on 
residential location of immigrants. An explicit policy goal in European countries is to 
“spread” immigrants, instead of having them concentrated in a limited number of areas. 
The idea is that if immigrants are not concentrated in specific residential areas, but are 
dispersed among the native population, the utility loss of assimilation will be lower for 
the  immigrants.  This  is  in  line  with  empirical  evidence  that  immigrants  who  tend  to 
cluster together will assimilate less, and have a larger inclination to stick to their own 
social norms (Kónya, 2003). The spreading policy as we model it, is a free lunch in the 
sense that no costs are involved. Naturally, this implies some bias in favor of such a 
policy, contrary to a policy that involves costs like subsidies on integration costs. Given 
this it appears that in our model a spreading policy will be supported even if services are 
rationed. As a second policy option we consider whether native workers will support a 
tax-financed policy aimed at decreasing the financial costs of assimilation.  
 
2. The model 
A two-sector economy is assumed. One sector is producing goods using skilled labor,  L, 
according to a linear production function  ) (L F F = . The other sector (to be called the 
service sector) is only using unskilled labor, U , according to  U G b = . The labor force 
consists of immigrants  M U I + =  and native workers N , where  ) (   M U is the number of 
non-assimilated (assimilated) immigrants. Immigrants who have decided to integrate into 
the  native  culture,  will  be  employed  as  skilled  workers  in  the  goods  sector.  Non-
                                                                                                                                                                             
skilled labour becomes relatively more scarce due to immigration of unskilled workers does not affect 
wages either.    5
assimilated  immigrants  remain  unskilled  and  will  be  employed  in  the  service  sector.  
Native workers are always skilled. 
  Prices in the service sector are at a level  p , that the voters assume to be fixed, 
and we assume, for simplicity, that this price is linked to the wage earned in this sector by 
b /  
U w p = .    
  At the individual level natives decide on the counsumption of goods and services. 
At the macro political level they choose the number of immigrants that can be allowed 
into the country. They decide on the basis of the following utility function: 
 
     ) log( ) ( ) log( ) log( U s q g f V N - + = d           (1) 
 
where      and   g f are individual consumption of goods and services, respectively. The last 
term indicates the disutility native individuals derive from cultural differences with the 
non-assimilated  immigrant  population.  The  parameter    s with    1 0 £ £ s indicates  the 
spreading  policy  with    1 = s indicating  the  absence  of  such  a  policy,    0 = s   implies  a 
maximal  spreading  policy.  The  function    ) (s q indicates  to  what  degree  such  a  policy 
affects the disutility of the natives. It is assumed that    0 ) ( > ¢ s q , i.e. the disutility the 
natives derive from living with immigrants will be larger at a less intensive spreading 
policy. 
  Individual  migrants  decide  on  the  consumption  of  goods  and  services,  and 
whether to adapt to the native culture, or not. Immigrants are heterogeneous with respect 




1 0    with  ) 1 ( log ) log( £ £ - + + = j j
I
j sU c g f V r r d g       (2) 
 
                                                           
4 Notice the similarity of this specification with the so-called attachment-to-home models, proposed by 
Mansoorian and Myers (1993).   6
The last term indicates attachment to immigrant culture where the parameter    j r indcates 
the  weight  the  individual  places  on  culture,  and  the  parameter ) 1 (   < g indicates  the 
economies-of-scale  of  enjoying  culture  with  fellow  non-assimilated  immigrants..  The 
variable  c  represents  the  culture  to  be  adopted  by  the  immigrants,  with  1) (c   0 = = c  
indicating  assimilation  to  their  own  (native)  culture.  Notice  that  in  the  absence  of 
spreading policy (   1 = s ),  the utility derived from sticking to immigrant culture (   0 = c ) 
increases  with  the  number  of  non-integrated  immigrants.  This  reflects  that  if  the 
government  does  not  intervene  in  the  location  of  immigrants,  the  tendency  to  gather 
together will reduce the incentives for immgrants to adapt to native culture. Individuals 
will enjoy their own culture more if they can share their feelings with ’enough’ fellow 
non-natives. If a maximal spreading policy prevails (   0 = s ) attachment to culture does 
not affect utility, and the immigrant will adopt native culture  1) (c   =  as a result. 
At the assumed price of services, equilibrium is not guaranteed. To derive under 
which conditions equilibrium on the services market occurs, assume that the number of 
integrated immigrants equals  , I M r =  where the parameter  r  indicates the percentage 
of the immigrants deciding to integrate into native culture. Non integrated immigrants 
I U ) 1 ( r - =  keep working in the services sector. The individual demand for services 






= , where   y is net income of an individual. As a result, rationing 
(unemployment) on the service market will occur if and only if
5, 
 
  M) (N ) ( + > < N U w U w d               (3) 
 
If wage in the service (goods) sector,    ), (   N U w w  is “too” large (“too” small), or if the 
utility weight on services,    d , is not large enough, unemployment of immigrant labor will 
occur, while demand will be rationed in the reversed cases. Moreover, the unemployment 
                                                           


















b . Inserting 
the definition  p / wU = b gives as the condition for equilibrium    M) (N+ = N U w U w d .   7





Immigrants decide whether or not to assimilate, i.e.    , 0 = c or    . 1 = c As the immigrants 
are heterogeneous, some individuals can be expected to integrate, and some not. As the 
assimilation choice is, moreover, affected by the prevailing market regime, we consider 
the rationing and unemployment regime in turn.  
 
Rationing regime 









. Assimilation means that the immigrants will become a skilled 
worker with the associated higher wage  
N w . On the other hand, assimilation involves a 
cost equal to K. Indicating the immigrants‘ wage, dependent on the assimilation choice 
by  ) (c w
I , and inserting the consumption choice for f and g into the utility function gives 
the immigrants‘ utility as a function of culture only,: 
   
g r d sU c g g p Kc c w c V j
I I
j ) 1 ( log ) ) ( log( ) ( - + + - - =       (4) 
 
where 
U I w c w = ) ( if    , 0 = c and 
N I w c w = ) ( if    1 = c . From this it can be concluded that 
an immigrant with a utility weight for culture equal to  j r  will adapt to native culture, if 



















1 ˆ g r r           (5) 
   8
For  a  given  spreading  policy    s ,  and  for  given  wages  and  integration  costs,  K,  the 
immigrants  with  an  attachment  to  their  own  culture  smaller  than  the  critical  value r ˆ  
choose to assimilate, while all other immigrants decide not to assimilate. The decision to 
assimilate  is  determined  by  the  relative  gain  in  net  expenditures  on  goods,  and  the 
number of immigrants. Given a uniform distribution of culture weights on the interval 
] 1 , 0 [ , the number of assimilated immigrants equals I M r ˆ = , while  I U ) ˆ 1 ( r - = . Using 




















) ˆ 1 ( ˆ g g r r           (6) 
It will be shown in the Appendix that given a restriction on the parameter g
7, and with a 
large enough number of immigrants, I, the critical value of  r  will decrease with an 
increasing  number  of  immigrants,  i.e.    / ˆ dI dr is  negative
8.  In  that  case,  it  holds  that 
. 1 ) / ˆ ( ) ˆ 1 ( / 0 < ¶ ¶ - - = < I I dI dU r r  In words, if the number of immigrants is relatively 
large, increasing the number of migrants will lead to a lower degree of assimilation, as 
measured by    ˆ r . As a result, the number of non-assimilated migrants will increase along 
with a higher number of immigrants, although not one-for-one. 
 
Unemployment regime  
Unemployed immigrants are supposed to receive a benefit equal to the unskilled wage. 
This benefit is financed by a lump-sum tax t on skilled workers. The indirect utility of an 
immigrant as a function of the culture choice, c, reads: 
g r t d sU c Kc c c w c V j
I I
j ) 1 ( ) ) ( log( ) 1 ( ) ( - + - - + =        (7) 
                                                                                                                                                                             
6 The results would not be affected if we had made the assumption that the number of rationed services to 
consumers is not uniform, but depends e.g. on their income. 
7 The restriction is r r g / ) 1 ( - <  which we will assume to hold. 
8 Notice that this implies that if the number of non assimilated immigrants is low, allowing in immigrants 
may lead to a higher degree of assimilation. For a large number of non assimilated immigrants, on the other 
hand, allowing in more immigrants will unambiguously imply to lower the relative degree of assimilation. 
We will assume the latter condition to hold in the sequel. So, our model has the property, first described by 
Lazear (1999) that clustering together by immigrants makes their assimilation less likely.   9


















r r g log
1 ~           (8) 
Equation  (8)  is  saying  that  the  net  wage  increase  following  assimilation,  taking  the 
assimilation costs into account, should be large enough to make a choice for assimilation 




















) ~ 1 ( ~           (9) 
Equation (9) implies that  dI d / ~   r is negative, and  . 1 / 0 < < dI dU  
Notice  that  given  the  assumption  that  low-skilled  workers  do  not  pay  the 
unemployment tax, the unemployment regime itself is a hindrance to assimilation due to 
the tax rate. If the number of immigrants increases under the unemployment regime the 
critical parameter  r ~decreases, i.e. immigrants assimilate less because the cultural factor 
of enjoying their culture with more like-minder persons has increased in value and the net 
skilled wage has decreased due to the higher unemployment tax. 
  
4. Immigration policy 
 
Immigration  policy  will  differ  according  to  the  prevailing  regime.  Under  rationing  a 
tendency to allow more immigrants to enter might exist, in order to increase the utility of 
consuming services, while such a tendency will not exist when there is unemployment of 
immigrants. We consider rationing and unemployment in turn. 
 
Rationing regime 
Under the rationing regime the natives’ indirect utility function reads, 
 
U s q g g p w V N N log ) ( log ) log( - + - = d           (10)   10
The natives in deciding on preferred migration take the effect of the number of migrants 
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        (11) 
     
The term in big brackets has a positive sign as long as rationing occurs. It describes the 
effect  on  the  utility  of  consuming  goods  and  services,  while  the  second  term  is  the 
cultural  effect  of  immigration  policy.  As  0 >
dI
dU
,  it  follows  that  the  demand  for 
























          (12) 
Notice that at the desired number of immigrants the rationing regime should hold. This 
can be seen easily by inserting the demand for services under equilibrium into condition 
(12) to get  U s q / ) ( - . Lifting the rationing constraint implies that the marginal benefit of 
service  consumption  equals  its  marginal  cost.  However,  for  native  workers,  this 
obviously cannot be individually optimal as the cultural disutility that non assimilated 
immigrants impose upon them, should be included as well in determining the desired 
consumption of services. 
 
Unemployment regime 
Given that, as we just saw, an optimal immigration policy will lead to rationing, it should 
follow that under an unemployment regime immigrants should not be allowed, i.e. that 
0 / < dI dV N .  This  is  easily  shown  to  be  true.  Under  the  unemployment  regime 
immigration policy follows from maximising: 
 
( )   log ) ( log ) 1 ( U s q w V
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As  0 /   and   0 / > > dI dU dI dt   it  immediately  follows  that  0 / < dI dV N .  A  rational 
immigration policy cannot lead to unemployment among immigrants. The intuition is 
obvious. Immigration in an unemployment regime leads to a larger number of unskilled 
workers, implying a higher cultural disutility and a higher tax rate, but no higher utility 
from  consuming  services,  as  additional  immigrants  do  not  lead  to  higher  services 
production. 
 
Figure 1. Political and market equilibrium 
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We have as a first result that an equilibrium in the market for services, where private 
marginal benefits and marginal costs are equal, cannot be politically optimal for native 
workers:  the  disutility  emerging  from  the  cultural  distance  with  the  marginal  non-
assimilated immigrant is not taken account of in market equilibrium. Figure 1 illustrates 
this. In politics the social marginal benefit (SMB) of unskilled immigrants is equated to 
the  current  price  p,  implying  that  the  optimal  number  of  non-assimilated  immigrants   12
equals U*. On the service market, however, excess demand will arise as individuals are 
not able to buy services until the private marginal benefits of consumption (PMB) are 
equal to the price. Given that prices are flexible there will be a tendency for prices to 
increase. Equilibrium in the service market will be restored when the price equals p*. At 
this price, however, the desired number of non- assimilated immigrants has gone down to 
U**.  So market forces cause the initially allowed number of migrants to become too 
large.  
   
Unemployment 
Our  model  thus  far  predicts  that  market  forces  will  lead  to  a  too  high  number  of 
immigrants. However, it does not predict unemployment: all non-assimilated immigrants 
will  be  employed  in  the  service  sector.  In  actual  fact  the  unemployment  rate  among 
immigrants is higher than among natives. This phenomenon can be fitted into our model 
if we take account of the well-known fact that a sizeable informal services sector exists, 
where self-production takes place, or where service sector workers are supplying services 
at prices below the formal price. The relative size of the informal sector is sensitive to 
price  changes  in  the  formal  sector.  In  particular,  it  might  be  the  case  that  there  is  a 
maximum to the price of services. That is, from some level of the price onwards the 
formal demand for services will decrease to zero, as home production is cheaper than 
purchasing services on the market. So above this maximum price, the formal sector will 
be  completely  replaced  by  the  informal  sector.  As  a  result  then  of  course  all  non-
assimilated immigrants will become unemployed. This may happen in our model when 
market forces, following rationing on the service market at the initial price, push the 
market price to the maximum price of services. If this maximum price is between the 
price p and p* in Figure 1, unemployment of service sector workers will be the result.  
 
5. Integration Policies 
 
From the previous section we conclude that, at a given price for services, an optimal 
immigration  policy  at  a  given  price  will  not  imply  equilibrium  but  rationing  on  the 
service market. Subsequently,  market forces will lead to an increase in service price, and,   13
from the perspective of the native voters, the number of immigrants that was considered 
optimal with the lower price, will then be considered as too high. This may go along with 
substantial unemployment amongst non-assimilated migrants when market forces push 
the price of services to a level where home production becomes cheaper than buying on 
the  market.  In  actual  fact,  unemployment  among  immigrants  is  in  many  European 
countries larger than unemployment among the natives and there is an increasing concern 
in  politics  about  the  large  number  of  non-assimilated  migrants.  This  indicates  that, 
indeed, it is difficult to allow in the optimal number of migrants, and that a tendency to 
overshoot the admittance of immigrants can be observed. Therefore, it is obviously of 
interest to consider policies aimed at integrating the immigrants into the native culture, as 
this can provide a utility gain for the natives.  
 
Spreading policies 
In  some  countries,  notably  the  Netherlands,  a  policy  of  spreading  the  location  of 
immigrants among the native population is a key aspect of policy towards immigrants. 
The idea is that by spreading immigrants the burden immigrants impose on natives is 
minimized,  and  the  incentives  of  immigrants  to  adapt  to  native  culture  will  be 
maximized.  The  first  aspect  has  been  modelled  by  the  function    ) (s q in  the  utility 
function of the natives; the second aspect is shaped by the term 
s sI in the culture term of 
the utility function of the immigrants. We have assumed that spreading policy does not 
involve  costs  for  the  government  and  is  extremely  effective.  In  particular,  if  the 
government  pursues  a  maximal  spreading  policy, , 0 = s   all  immigrants  will  adapt  to 
native culture, as  1 ˆ = r in that case. Given these (obviously non-realistic) assumptions, 
we  investigate  whether  for  a  given  number  of  immigrants  and  for  a  given  spreading 
policy with  , 0 > s  the natives prefer the spreading policy to be intensified, i.e. to have a 
decrease in the values of the policy parameter  . s  Obviously, the regime is a determining 
factor again. In particular, under the unemployment regime, too few immigrants have 
decided  to  adapt  with  a  too  large  capacity  of  the  services  sector  as  a  consequence. 
Intensifying spreading policy, i.e. decreasing  , s then implies an increase of the critical   14
value  for  individual  assimilation,  . ~ r   Native  utility  will,  therefore,  unambiguously 
increase. 
  Under the rationing regime
9, an increase of native utility will not be guaranteed 
by  intensifying  spreading  policy.  As  the  amount  of  services  that  can  be  consumed 
decreases by intensifying spreading policy, for some value of   , 0 > s  further decreases in 
s will lead to lower native utility because of lower consumption. However, the positive 
effect on utility of the lower cultural burden immigrants impose, is the dominant effect, 
as we shall now show.  Under rationing the effect of a spreading policy on native utility 
follows from: 
 
0 log ) ( ’
) (
) (
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    (15) 
 
The first term indicates the effect spreading has on the utility of consuming goods and 
services. As spreading increases, the number of immigrants that adapt to native culture 
will increase, i.e  0 >
ds
g d
. Therefore, obviously, spreading will have a negative effect on 
utility through the diminished consumption of services. The last two terms indicate the 
utility gain of the diminishing burden of cultural differences. Notice that the optimal 
number of immigrants with a given spreading policy is determined such that the cultural 
disutility of the marginal immigrant is equated to the marginal utility of consuming more 
services.  As a result, if the optimal number of immigrants is allowed in, the first two 
terms of equation (15) exactly cancel out and only the term –q’(s)logU remains
10.  
Consequently, even if the optimal number of migrants is allowed in, intensifying the 
spreading policy will imply a utility gain as every non-assimilated worker causes a lower 
burden. The spreading policy, as we formulated it, should therefore be an effective and 
popular policy instrument to smooth the negative side effects of immigration.  
                                                           
9 The same holds in case of equilibrium on the service market.   15
 
Subsidizing integration costs 
A second policy to increase the native culture choice by immigrants is by subsidizing the 
integration costs immigrants have to incur at integration. Asuming that the subsidies are 
paid for by the native workers, a more pronounced trade-off between gains and losses of 
this type of policy occurs. Unlike spreading policy, this type of policy can fail to be 
supported by the native voter if the unemployment regime prevails. In particular, this 
policy will not be supported if the marginal cost of the subsidy policy, consisting of the 
decrease in native net wage due to the subsidy, is larger than the marginal benefit of the 
subsidy policy, consisting in a decrease in the unemployment tax and a decrease in the 




In  this  paper,  we  considered  an  economy  where  native  voters  determine  the  optimal 
number of immigrants. Immigrants can integrate into the native culture, but if they do not 
integrate  they  will  be  employed  as  unskilled  workers  in  the  service  sector  of  the 
economy. We showed that, if cultural variables are an important factor in immigration 
policy,  and  voters  take  the  market  price  for  services  as  given,  one  should  expect  no 
equilibrium on the market for low-skill services. Equilibrium on the market for services, 
where  private  marginal  benefits  and  marginal  costs  of  consuming  services  are  equal, 
would imply that the disutility of cultural distance between natives and non assimilated 
immigrants  was  not  taken  into  account.  As  a  result,  political  decision  making  on 
immigration  will  lead  to  a  shortage  in  the  supply  of  services  produced  by  unskilled 
immigrants. Market forces will then engender a price increase of services implying that 
the number of migrants allowed on the basis of the initial price is no longer the optimal 
number, but has become too high. Moreover, the market for services may collapse if 
price  increases  imply  that  demand  and  supply  for  services  will  shift  to  the  “shadow 
                                                                                                                                                                             
10 Formally, inserting from (11)  0 =
dI
dV N
into (15) and using the envelop theorem, we get:   16
economy”,  in  turn  leading  to  high  unemployment  amongst  non-assimilated  migrants. 
Assuming that it is not possible to remove immigrants who were allowed in at an earlier 
stage, the obvious conclusion is that disutility of cultural distance in combination with 
market forces leads to a number of immigrants living in a destination country that is 
higher than the optimal number.  
Apparently,  immigration  policy  does  not  easily  lead  to  an  optimal  inflow  of 
immigrants. Other instruments should in that case be used to correct for the sub optimal 
decisions  on  immigration.  One  instrument  that  we  considered  was  what  we  called  a 
spreading  policy.  This  policy,  actually,  is  currently  much  debated  in  the  European 
immigration countries in view of the existing “immigrant ghettos” in the big cities in 
those  countries.  From  our  simplified  model  we  concluded  that  spreading  is  in  many 
instances a policy that will be welfare improving for natives. Another policy instrument 
that  can  correct  for  the  sub  optimality  of  immigration  policy  is  the  provision  of 
integration subsidies to non-assimilated immigrants. As this policy entails costs for the 
native workers, unanimous support for subsidizing immigrants who decide to integrate is 
not guaranteed. 
We add that the results of our model are based on the presumption that voters are 
able  to  perceive  the  effects  immigration  has  on  the  cultural  nuisance  caused  by 
immigrants, and the effects of immigration on the utility of service consumption. We, 
however, did not assume that voters are able to infer the effect immigration has on the 
development  of  the  market  where  unskilled  immigrants  work.  This  is  in  line  with 
empirical evidence (Mayda, 2004), but relaxing this assumption will be the subject of 
further research.   
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For the rationing regime the relationship between  r ˆ  and I is given by equation (6). From 
that equation we can derive: 
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Inserting (A.2) into (A.1) gives: 
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< it  follows  that  the  
terms in brackets at the left-hand side of (A.3) is positive.  The term in brackets at the 
right-hand side will be negative if   
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In  words,  0 / ˆ < dI dr will  hold  if  the  number  of  non-assimilated  immigrants  I  is  large 
enough.     
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